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Non-technical Summary 
 
It is well-known that R&D and innovation investments by the private sector suffer from 
market failure and thus the investment level in the economy is below the social desirable 
level. It is also a well-known fact that governments of industrialized countries try to correct 
for such market failure by subsidizing R&D and innovation. It has been discussed for decades 
whether those policies are subject to crowding out effects. A topic that did not receive a lot of 
attention in the literature so far, however, is the fact that many different policies may 
influence a private investor‟s decision on R&D and innovation activities simultaneously. So 
far, scholars have either evaluated one specific policy instrument or otherwise treatment 
effects have been derived as averages of different policy interventions. 
In this paper, we go one step further and explicitly distinguish between national and 
European policies. In particular, we are interested in measuring the impact of one specific 
policy, namely direct subsidies for innovation and R&D given that this constitutes the main 
policy instrument in Germany. More precisely, we analyze the relationship between national 
funding, European funding and the combination of both on innovation input and output using 
a sample of German firms.  
We conduct a multiple treatment effects analysis on the impact that national subsidies 
compared to, or in combination with, European subsidies have on innovation and R&D 
intensity. Furthermore, in order to estimate the impact of these policies on innovation 
performance, we analyze whether subsidies, and the different combinations of the latter, have 
an impact on innovation sales, on sales with market novelties or on future patents 
applications. Since filing patents for subsidized R&D is often advised by the funding agency, 
we further analyze whether the filed patents by subsidized firms get more or less forward 
citations than patents filed in the counterfactual situation of getting no or other subsidies. 
Positive effects of those treatments, and the awareness of which combination of policy mix 
(national, European or both) has the highest impact on innovative activity, is a crucial 
prerequisite for efficient European and national innovation policies.  
We find that both EU grants and national grants, as well as the combination of both, lead 
to higher innovation input in the economy when compared to a situation where these policies 
would be absent, i.e. the counterfactual where the recipient firms would not be funded. In 
addition, we find that EU grants compared to national grants have a higher effect on 
innovation input which can possibly explained by a larger average grant amount. Hence, full 
crowding out can be rejected for both types of grants.   
  
 
 
With regards to innovation performance, we find evidence that publicly funded firms do 
not perform worse when compared to a counterfactual where the recipient firms would have 
the same innovation budgets without receiving subsidies. Keeping innovation investment 
constant allows us to indirectly conclude that the granted research projects have a similar 
productivity as purely privately funded projects. In terms of products sold that are new to the 
market, we find that firms that receive funding from both sources have the highest sales. We 
further find that firms that do not get subsidies or get subsidies from either one of the sources 
would yield more sales with market novelties if they would get a top-up from either of the 
sources. In terms of total innovation sales, we find superiority of national grants when 
compared to a counterfactual of no grants or receiving EU grants only. In terms of future 
patent applications, we find that nationally funded firms (only national or in combination with 
EU funds) are more likely to apply for patents in period t+1. In addition, we can conclude that 
the filed patents were of high quality given that they have on average more forward citations 
per patent than the patents filed in the counterfactual situation where no grants (or grants from 
only one source) are received.This finding that national subsidies (and the combination of 
national and EU subsidies) seem to be successful is reassuring in the light of future German 
policy programs where the goal is to increasingly deliver public support from the EU through 
existing national channels.  
 
  
  
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze (Summary in German) 
 
Investitionen in Forschung und Entwicklung (FuE) und Innovation der Wirtschaft sind von 
Marktversagen betroffen, und daher liegt das tatsächliche unter dem gesellschaftlich 
wünschenswerten Investitionsniveau. Daher versuchen Regierungen industrialisierter Staaten 
dieses Marktversagen durch die Vergabe von Subventionen zu korrigieren. Ob solche 
Politikmaßnahmen Mitnahmeeffekte erzeugen wurden in der Literatur seit Jahrzehnten 
diskutiert. Ein Thema, dass jedoch bisher weniger Aufmerksamkeit erlangt hat, ist die 
Tatsache, dass in der Regel eine Vielzahl von Politikinstrumenten Einfluss auf 
Investitionsentscheidungen von Unternehmen haben. Bisher wurde in der Literatur entweder 
ein spezifisches öffentliches Förderprogramm evaluiert, oder ein Durchschnittseffekt aus 
zahlreichen Programmen abgeleitet.  
In dieser Studie gehen wir daher einen Schritt weiter, und unterscheiden explizit zwischen 
Förderinstrumenten der Europäischen Union und nationalen Politiken. Von zentralem 
Interesse sind direkte projekt-bezogene Subventionen für FuE und Innovation. Wir 
untersuchen mithilfe einer Stichprobe deutscher Unternehmen den Einfluss von nationalen 
und Europäischen Fördermaßnahmen, sowie Kombinationen derer, auf den 
Innovationsaufwand sowie –erfolg. Dazu verwenden wir ein multiples „Treatment“ 
Analyseverfahren. Als Maße für den Innovationsaufwand verwenden wir die FuE-Intensität 
und die Innovationsintensität der Unternehmen. Als Erfolgsmaße werden das 
Patentierungsverhalten, Umsätze mit innovativen Produkten im Allgemeinen sowie Umsätze 
mit Marktneuheiten. Da Patentanmeldungen häufig von den staatlichen 
Fördermittelvergabestellen als Signal positiver Forschungsergebnisse erwünscht werden, 
prüfen wir auch, ob die Patente in einem zukünftigen 5-Jahreszeitraum mehr oder weniger 
Zitationen erhalten. 
Es zeigt sich, dass sowohl EU als auch nationale Fördermittel, sowie die Kombination aus 
beiden Quellen, zu höherem Innovationsaufwand in den begünstigten Unternehmen führen. 
Ferner stellt sich heraus, dass EU Mittel höhere Effekte hervorrufen als nationale Quellen. 
Dies kann möglicherweise durch einen im Durchschnitt höheren Förderbetrag pro Projekt in 
den EU-Programmen im Vergleich zu nationalen Politiken erklärt werden. Unsere Ergebnisse 
schließen somit vollkommene Mitnahmeeffekte generell aus.  
Im Hinblick auf den Innovationserfolg zeigt die ökonometrische Analyse, dass die 
geförderten Unternehmen im Allgemeinen nicht weniger gute Ergebnisse erzielen als in einer 
kontrafaktischen Situation in der keine Fördermittel erhalten worden wären (bei gleichen 
  
 
 
Innovationsbudgets). Dadurch dass in diesem Untersuchungsschritt die Innovationsbudgets 
konstant gehalten werden, können wir indirekt darauf schließen, dass die geförderten Projekte 
eine ähnliche Produktivität haben wie rein privat finanzierte. Im Hinblick auf den Umsatz mit 
Marktneuheiten finden wir, dass Unternehmen, die Fördermittel aus beiden Quellen beziehen, 
die höchsten Umsätze erzielen. Zusätzlich stellt sich heraus, dass Firmen die keine 
Fördermittel oder lediglich Mittel aus einer Quelle beziehen mehr Erfolg mit dem Absatz von 
Marktneuheiten erzielen würden, wenn sie zusätzliche Mittel bekämen. Bei Umsätzen mit 
innovativen Produkten im Allgemeinen erzielen nationale Fördermittel höhere Erfolge (a) als 
EU-Gelder (b) im Vergleich zu der kontrafaktischen Situation wenn das gleiche 
Innovationsbudget rein privat finanziert wäre. Bei den Patentanmeldungen zeigen sich 
ähnliche Resultate. National geförderte Firmen (entweder Empfänger, die ausschließlich 
nationale Mittel erhalten, oder solche die sowohl nationale als auch EU-Mittel erhalten) 
melden mit größerer Wahrscheinlichkeit mehr Patente in der Periode t+1 an. Außerdem 
können wir schlussfolgern, dass die angemeldeten Patente von hoher Qualität sind, da sie im 
Durchschnitt in der Zukunft mehr Zitationen erhalten als solche Patente, die in der 
kontrafaktischen Situation angemeldet werden, in der keinerlei Förderung erhalten wurde. 
Dieses Ergebnis, dass nationale Förderprogramme (und die Kombination von nationalen 
und EU-Programmen) erfolgreich zu sein scheinen, ist im Hinblick auf zukünftige 
Entwicklungen in der Forschungs- und Technologiepolitik vielversprechend. Das zukünftige 
Ziel ist stärkere Vernetzung nationaler und Europäischer Maßnahmen durch existierende, 
länder-spezifische Kanäle.  
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1. Introduction 
Ever since Schumpeter‟s seminal work, the importance of R&D and innovation has been 
widely acknowledged among economic scholars as well as among entrepreneurs and policy 
makers. As a matter of fact, the technological progress triggered by R&D and innovation is 
indispensible for sustained growth and long-term competitiveness. Hence, investment in 
knowledge is of primary importance to keep economic activity at a sound level. 
Despite these broadly accepted facts, investment in R&D in the business sector suffers 
generally from market failure (Arrow, 1962). First, the generated knowhow by R&D activities 
can spillover to competitors, making it impossible for a company to appropriate all the returns 
from its initial investment. Second, firms often face financial constraints for R&D 
investments due to asymmetric information between the company and potential external 
investors. Indeed, not only are R&D investments linked to a high uncertainty about the 
expected returns, but unlike investment in physical capital, R&D expenses cannot serve as 
collateral. Most of the investment goes into wages of R&D staff and is thus immediately sunk. 
As a consequence, firms often face credit constraints for R&D and innovation investment (see 
Hall and Lerner, 2010, for a recent survey).  
These market failure arguments explain why the socially optimal investment level is 
generally higher than the level of private investment. Indeed, while the social returns to R&D 
and innovation can be substantial, the private returns are uncertain. Even though firms cannot 
appropriate all of their investments, they have to bear all of the costs (Nelson, 1959, Arrow, 
1962). With the objective to reduce this gap between the actual private investment and the 
socially desirable investment as well as in order to ensure national competitiveness and to 
provide new and improved technology for public sector functions, governments typically 
subsidize R&D and innovation activities. In the ideal case, this reduces the price of socially 
valuable R&D projects for private investors to a level at which it becomes profitable to invest. 
Government intervention in business related R&D is thus justified by market imperfection 
and is since many years common practice in most industrialized countries. Furthermore, while 
the use of other policy measures such as e.g. trade and industrial policies is regulated through 
international agreements, R&D policies are one of the few remaining sovereign policies that 
national governments have to influence their industrial activities (Haaland and Kind, 2006). 
Yet, with the exception of a few countries – including Austria, Germany, Korea and the 
United States - many OECD countries have responded to financial pressures by cutting their 
annual budget provisions for research and development (OECD, 2010).  
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Even though the European Council stimulated R&D investments through its “Action Plan 
2010” and through the renewed Lisbon Strategy on growth and job creation, Europe lags 
behind its main competitors, the United States and Japan. While the US spends some 2.8% of 
its GDP on R&D and Japan around 3.4%, the EU is at a mere 1.8%, and hence still a long 
way to go to the formerly foreseen target of 3% for 2010 (OECD, 2010). To narrow this gap 
between the EU and some other major economic players, the European Commission 
supplements national policies by using different mixes of innovation policy instruments to 
fasten the pace of technological progress. More concretely, it has adopted three main 
instruments to achieve the goals of the renewed Lisbon Strategy on growth and job creation, 
namely the 7th Research Framework Program (FP7), the Competitiveness and Innovation 
Program (CIP) and the Structural Funds. As part of the Structural Fund, the Cohesion Policy 
alone is spending some €80 billion on enterprise and innovation support in the current period 
(2007 – 2013), representing a higher amount than the one spent on transport or human 
resources, with innovation representing the only field to be a key priority in all Member 
States.  
Due to the remaining gap in public investments in R&D, and because of decreasing 
European national budgets, it is essential to identify the most efficient way of allocating 
public money. The key question in assessing a policy mix is whether it is appropriate, 
efficient and effective. Ideally, a policy mix takes into account possible interactions among 
instruments (i.e. national subsidies vs. European or other regional subsidies, direct subsidies 
vs. tax incentives, patent laws, low interest rates etc.) and ensures adapted support for each 
country‟s innovation systems, needs and challenges. It is thus fundamental that governments 
adopt strategies allowing them to choose beneficiaries of public support that are most 
proficient to achieve the desired results. A better understanding of the impact of policy 
measures adopted on a national or regional level thus contributes to a more pragmatic 
assessment of what can realistically be expected of these policies in terms of pace and 
direction of innovative activities. 
In this paper, we are interested in measuring the impact of one specific policy, namely 
direct subsidies for innovation and R&D. More precisely, we analyze the relationship between 
national funding, European funding and the combination of both on innovation input and 
output using a sample of German firms. Germany appears to be a very appropriate case for 
this study, as Germany is one of the few European countries that does not maintain policy 
schemes granting tax credits to R&D performers, but uses direct subsidies for R&D 
performers as a main policy tool. Therefore, the estimated effects of direct subsidies are less 
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confounded with other policies in Germany than in other European countries that also grant 
R&D tax credits to eligible firms. 
We conduct a multiple treatment effects analysis on the impact that national subsidies 
compared to, or in combination with, European subsidies have on innovation and R&D 
intensity. Furthermore, in order to estimate the impact of these policies on innovation 
performance at the firm-level, we analyze whether subsidies, and the different combination of 
the latter, have an impact on innovation sales, on sales with market novelties or on future 
patents filed. Since filing patents for subsidized R&D is often advised by the funding agency, 
we further analyze whether patents filed by subsidized firms get more or less forward 
citations than patents filed in the counterfactual situation of getting no or other subsidies. 
Positive effects of those treatments, and the awareness of which combination of policy mix 
(national, European or both) has the highest impact on innovative activity, is a crucial 
prerequisite for European and national innovation policies to achieve the goal of securing 
long-term growth, international competitiveness and employment by using public money as 
concise as possible. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to empirically 
distinguish and simultaneously analyze national subsidies, European subsidies and the impact 
the combination of both can have on innovation and R&D intensity as well as on innovation 
performance of recipient firms.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the literature. 
Section 3 describes the research question, the methodology and the data. Section 4 presents 
the empirical findings and Section 5 concludes. 
2. This study in the context of existing literature 
For many years now, the impact of R&D policies on firms‟ innovation behavior has been of 
interest in the economic literature. Mostly, researchers were interested in knowing whether 
public subsidies crowd out private R&D investment. David et al. (2000) survey micro and 
macroeconomic studies on the impact of public R&D subsidies on private R&D expenditure. 
One major result of their survey is that in most estimations reviewed, the selectivity of the 
funded firms into public funding programs is largely ignored. Indeed, recipients of subsidies 
might be chosen by the government because they are more R&D intensive or because they 
represent more promising candidates in succeeding their research projects. In this case, 
funding becomes endogenous to innovative activity, and its inclusion in a linear regression of 
e.g. R&D intensity on government subsidies would lead to a bias. More recent studies 
addressing the selection bias include Busom (2000), Wallsten (2000), Lach (2002), Czarnitzki 
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and Fier (2002), Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), Duguet (2004), González et al. (2005), 
Hussinger (2008) and Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento (2010). With the exception of Wallsten 
(2000), most studies exclude total crowding out of private investment through public grants. 
Indeed, basing himself on a sample of 479 observations and using a 3SLS approach, Wallsten 
(2000) finds that grants crowd out firm-financed R&D dollar per dollar in his analysis of the 
US Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. However, the author does not 
exclude the possibility that the grants might have had a positive effect on keeping the funded 
firms‟ R&D activities constant, which might not have been possible otherwise. Lach (2002) 
analyzing crowding out effects in Israeli manufacturing using DiD and dynamic panel models 
or Gonzales et al. (2005), analyzing crowding out effects of public funding on firm-funded 
R&D in the Spanish manufacturing sector, using simultaneous equation models with 
threshold, reject total crowding out. Many of the other studies answering the question of how 
much subsidized firms would have invested in R&D if they would not have participated in 
public policy programs by applying matching methods, also exclude total crowding out. 
Those studies include among others Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), finding that Eastern 
German firms which received public subsidies increased their innovation activities by about 
four percentage points; Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004), evaluating the effect of public R&D 
funding on R&D intensity and patent outcome in Germany; Duguet (2004), focusing on 
growth of the ratio of firms‟ R&D to sales for France; or Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento (2010) 
in a cross-country comparative evaluation, all reject total crowding out, even though some 
find evidence of partial crowding out. Most of these studies are based on cross-sectional data 
and use data from national innovation surveys, often complemented by patent data or R&D 
funding data from national authorities (see also Cerulli, 2010, for a recent, comprehensive 
survey).  
However, none of these studies differentiates between national and European subsidies. 
Usually, a selection between grant applicants is made, and beneficiaries are chosen according 
to a certain number of criteria. These criteria differ according to whether the subsidy is 
granted by a government or by the European Commission
1
. Not only do expectations of the 
suggested projects differ from a purely technical point of view, but administrative and 
bureaucratic requirements might differ as well, forcing the beneficiaries to keep track of 
expenses, deliverables, workplans and timetables. This in turn might trigger administrative 
know-how, vital for the sound management of any successful project. Even though each 
                                                 
1
 For further information on public R&D policies employed by the European Commission and the German 
government, cf. Appendix A. 
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government might apply different requirements, the EU applies the same ones to every 
eligible country. Hence, being able to assess if EU grants further enhance R&D and 
innovation intensity and higher R&D per sales or more patent activity compared to national 
grants will allow us to shed some light on the success of public policies with respect to 
European grants and with respect to how these policies could better function hand in hand.  
In order to evaluate this effect, we will apply a matching estimator in a multiple treatment 
setting, analyzing the effects of national and/or European subsidies on R&D intensity and 
performance.  
3. Research design, methodology and data 
3.1. Research question  
In line with the literature, we investigate how different firm characteristics affect companies‟ 
participation in public funding schemes, and how this in turn affects R&D input and 
innovation performance.We distinguish 4 groups of firms: (i) firms that get no subsidies at all, 
(ii) firms that get only EU funding, (iii) firms that get only funding from national sources and 
(iv) firms that get funding from both these sources combined.  
Following the methodology by Gerfin and Lechner (2002) allowing for multiple 
treatments, we consider the receipt of a national subsidy, a European subsidy and both sources 
as heterogeneous “treatments” in the subsequent analyses.2 This allows us to disentangle the 
effects due to national funding, to European funding and to funding of both these sources. 
Given our possible combinations of treatment, we can distinguish between the cases of public 
funding shown in Table 1. First, innovation input is analysed, i.e. we use total innovation 
intensity as well as R&D intensity as dependent variables. Second, we are interested in 
knowing what the effect of (the combination of) subsidies is on innovation performance. 
More precisely, we estimate whether a treatment leads to higher sales of new products, or to 
increased patenting activity in the recipient firms. In this second part of the study, we keep the 
innovation input constant, i.e. we match on the two propensity scores of funding receipt and 
on innovation input.
3
 This allows testing two hypotheses: on the one hand, we can test, for 
instance, whether publicly funded firms achieve the same innovation performance as in the 
                                                 
2
 See also Czarnitzki et al. (2007) who used that methodology for a multiple treatment effects study on 
subsidies and R&D collaborations in Germany and Finland. 
3
 If one would not hold innovation input constant, the regressions would obviously suffer from an omitted 
variable bias. Suppose we find in the first step of the analysis that subsidies trigger more innovation input. Then 
it would be trivial to investigate whether these firms also achieve more innovation output if the input is not held 
constant.  
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counterfactual situation of not being funded. If that would not be the case, we could conclude 
that the subsidized projects are actually of lower quality or less productive than projects that 
are conducted from privately financed resources. On the other hand, we can also test whether 
a certain type of subsidy (EU vs. national) yields higher performance with the same total 
innovation budget at the firm level. This could hint at differences in selection criteria of the 
agencies and more successful project management possibly triggered through reporting 
requirements induced by the funding authorities. 
For both exercises, the cases presented in Table 1 are investigated. The cases in italic, 
namely cases 6, 8 and 9 could not be estimated due to data limitations (see the results section 
below for more details on the methodology and data). 
 
Table 1: Research question 
  Actual status (m) 
 
  No funding 
Only national 
funding 
Only EU 
funding 
Funding from 
both sources 
C
o
u
n
te
rf
a
ct
u
a
l 
(l
) No funding 
 
case 1 case 2 case 3 
Only national funding case 7 
 
case 4 case 5 
Only EU funding case 8 case 9 
 
case 6 
Funding from both sources case 10 case 11 case 12   
Note: The table reads from column to row. E.g., case1: “What would the output of firms that only getnational 
funding be, if they would not have been funded at all?“; case 4: “Would the output of firms that only get EU 
funding differ if they only got national funding?”; case 10: “Would a firm that gets no public support spend more 
on R&D and innovation if it would get funded from both, the EU and the national government?” 
 
Suppose that there are M different states of treatments and the receipt of one particular 
treatment m is indicated by the variable   *       +. The average treatment effect of a 
firm receiving m relative to a firm receiving l (no treatment) can be written as:  
 
  (    )    (  |   )    (  |   )      (1) 
 
where Y
m
 and Y
l
 denote the outcome of the different states. Our different treatment 
categories can take the following different m “values”: no funding at all, only national 
funding, only EU funding, both types of funding. Each of those possible cases involves an 
estimate of a counterfactual situation, as for firms receiving treatment (meaning firms in m), 
we can only observe the actual value of the outcome. However, we cannot observe the 
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outcome variable in the counterfactual situation l. This counterfactual situation is not 
observable and thus needs to be estimated. This is defined as the basic problem of causal 
inference (Holland, 1986).  
Estimating  (    ) just by comparing two corresponding sub-samples of firms in state m 
and l could lead to erroneous results, because one would not have accounted for a potential 
selection bias. Indeed, as explained in the literature review, subsidized and un-subsidized as 
well as nationally and European subsidized firms might differ in their characteristics. First, 
companies themselves choose to apply for public funding. Administrative burden or 
obligations of publishing some of the findings at the risk of divulging secrecy or free riding 
by competitors might trigger a certain reluctance against applying for public funding. Second, 
based on their applications, the funding agencies decide which firms will benefit from public 
support. As a consequence, neither national nor European funding can realistically be 
interpreted as a random process. Hence, firms receiving funding might differ from firms not 
receiving any public support, and firms receiving national support might present different 
characteristics from firms receiving European aid. It is thus vital that this selection is 
accounted for when comparing firms in state m with firms in state l.   
3.2. Econometric approach 
In econometrics of evaluation literature, different estimation strategies are suggested to 
correct for selection bias (see Heckman et al., 1999, Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009, for 
surveys) including the difference-in-difference estimator, control function approaches 
(selection models), instrumental variable (IV) estimation and non-parametric matching.For 
the difference-in-difference method, panel data is required with observations before and after 
(or while) the treatment (change of subsidy status). As our database (to be described in the 
following subsection) consists of cross-sections of several years, where many firms are 
observed only once, we cannot apply this estimator. For the application of IV estimators and 
selection models one needs valid instruments (or an “exclusion restriction” in the selection 
model case) for the treatment variables. It is very difficult in our case to find possible 
candidates being used as instruments. Even though our dataset contains a rich set of variables 
concerning innovative activities, they cannot be interpreted as exogenous to the treatment. 
Hence, the most appropriate choice is the matching estimator for our data. Its main advantage 
over IV and selection models is that we neither have to assume any functional form for the 
outcome equation nor is a distributional assumption on the error terms of the selection 
equation and the outcome equation necessary. The disadvantage is that it does only control for 
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the selection on observables, that is, one assumes that these variables are good proxies of the 
unobserved factors that might affect your outcome (Rubin, 2008). However, as we discuss in 
the next subsection, our covariates allow us to assume that we observe all the necessary 
variables and that as a consequence selection on unobservable effects is unlikely.  
Matching estimators have been applied and discussed, among others, by Angrist (1998), 
Dehejia and Wahba (1999), Heckman et al. (1998a, 1998b), and Lechner (1999, 2000). 
However, the case considered most frequently in the literature is the one with just one binary 
treatment. Imbens (2000), Lechner (2001) and Gerfin and Lechner (2002) extend the 
matching to allow for multiple programs.  
Matching isbased on the intuitively attractive idea that a counterfactual situation for 
companies in state m can be estimated fromthe sample of companies receiving l. The 
matching estimator consists of creating a sample of firms in l that is comparable to the sample 
of firms in m, conditional on a set of a-priori defined characteristics (X). In the empirical 
application below we denote the estimated sample of state l as matched controls. 
The matching estimator is justified by the assumption that the outcome is statistically 
independent of the treatment. This is the case if the conditional independence assumption 
(CIA) introduced by Rubin (1977) is respected. Based on appropriate characteristics X, the 
selection problem is overcome, that is, the samples in states m and l have been balanced with 
respect to X and come close to an experimental setting. In this case, one can compare the 
outcome of the group in state m with the selected control group from state l having similar 
characteristics in X, and the observed outcome of the selected control group serves as an 
estimate for the counterfactual situation. Remaining differences in the outcome between both 
groups can thus be assigned to the treatment. In addition to the CIA, another important 
precondition for consistency of the matching estimator is common support, i.e. it is necessary 
that the control group contains at least one sufficiently similar observation for each treated 
firm. In practice, the sample to be evaluated is restricted to common support. If the overlap 
between the samples is too small, the matching estimator is not applicable. In other words, for 
each treatment analysis, the observations with probabilities larger than the smallest maximum 
and smaller than the largest minimum of all sub-samples defined by S are deleted.   
As the matching procedure requires the definition of a set of characteristics X, one might 
run into thecurse of dimensionality problem. Suppose X contains only one variable. It would 
be intuitive tolook for a control observation in state l that has exactly the same value in X as 
the correspondingfirm in m. However, if we employ numerous variables in the matching 
routine, it will become very complicated to find any control observation. Rosenbaum and 
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Rubin (1983) have shown that it is sufficient to balance the samples on the propensity score as 
a single index and thus to reduce the number of variables included in the matching function to 
just one.The idea is to use the propensity score for each treatmentm for the whole sample and 
find pairs of firms from each sub-sample of interest that have thesame probability of receiving 
the treatmentm. In other words, we pair each treated firm with one single non-treated firm, 
where the pairs are chosen based on the degree of similarity in the estimated probability to 
participate in a public subsidy scheme (i.e. the probability of receiving national, European or 
both kind of financial support). Suppose the choice probability of the alternative j conditional 
on X is  (   |   )     ( ) and we want to calculate the effect of treatment m 
compared withl on the firms in m. Following Gerfin and Lechner (2002), the treatment effect 
can be calculated by 
 (    |   )   (  |   )   (  |   ) 
  (  |   )      ( )   ( )* , 
  |   ( )   ( )    -|   +   (2) 
where the first term is replaced by the mean value of the outcome variable of the treated 
firms in statem, and the second term, the counterfactual situation, is replaced by the mean of 
the selected control group in state l. The average treatment effect is estimated by the mean 
difference in the outcome of the matched pairs.  
The matching protocol is summarized in Table 2 and follows Gerfin and Lechner (2002). 
In order to obtain the propensity score for our matching routine, we estimate a probit model. 
More precisely, we specify a seemingly unrelated probit model (also called bivariate 
dichotomous probit model) on the probability of receiving national funding and European 
funding. The matching estimator used in this study is a variant of the nearest neighbour 
matching. We use caliper matching introduced by Cochran and Rubin (1973). The intuition of 
caliper matching is to avoid “bad” matches (those for which the value of the matching 
argument Zj is far from Zi) by imposing a threshold of the maximum distance allowed 
between the treated and the control group. That is, a match for firm i is only chosen if ||Zj – Zi|| 
< ԑ, where ԑ is a pre-specified tolerance. 
In order to match on two propensity scores, we calculate the Mahalanobis distance to 
obtain a one-dimensional measure for the similarity of control observations, as outlined in 
Table 2. Note that we require the observations on firms in the selected control group l to 
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belong to the same year, the same industry and the same region (Eastern versus Western 
Germany) as the firms in the treatment group m.
4
 
Table 2: The matching routine 
Step 1 Specify and estimate a probit model to obtain the propensity scores [ ̇̂ ( )  ̂ ( )    ̂ ( )]. 
Step 2 Restrict the sample to common support: delete all observations on treated firms with probabilities 
larger than the maximum and smaller than the minimum in the potential control group. (This step is 
also performed for other covariates that are possibly used in addition to the propensity score as 
matching arguments.) 
Step 3 Estimate the counterfactual expectations of the outcome variables. For a given value of m and l, the 
following steps are performed: 
a) Choose one observation from the subsample of treated firms and delete it from that pool. 
b) Find an observation in the sub-sample of participants in l that is as close as possible to the 
one chosen in step a) in terms of the propensity scores. Closeness is based on the 
Mahalanobis distance between this firm and all non-subsidized firms in order to find the most 
similar control observation.    
' 1
ij j i j i
MD Z Z Z Z

   
 
where   is the empirical 
covariance matrix of the matching arguments based on the sample of potential controls. Do 
not remove the selected controls from the pool of potential controls, so that it can be used 
again.  
c) Repeat a) and b) until no observation in m is left. 
d) Using the matched comparison group formed in c), compute the respective conditional 
expectation by the sample mean. Note that the same observation may appear more than once 
in that group. 
Step 4 Repeat step 3 for all combinations of m and l.  
Step 5 Compute the estimate of the treatment effects using the results of step 4.  
Step 6 To estimate the counterfactual situation, we perform sampling with replacement.An ordinary t-statistic 
on mean differences would thus be biased, because it does not take the appearance of repeated 
observations into account. Therefore, to be able to draw conclusions on statistical inference, we have 
to correct the standard errors. We follow Lechner (2001) and calculate his estimator for an asymptotic 
approximation of the standard errors. 
 
 
3.3. Data source, variables and descriptive statistics  
Data sources 
The data used in this paper stem from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), which is the 
German part of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). The CIS, launched in 1991 jointly 
by Eurostat and the Innovation and SME Program, aims at improving the empirical basis for 
innovation activities at the firm level in the Member States. The CIS covers all EU Member 
States, Norway and Iceland using a largely harmonized questionnaire throughout participating 
countries. Thus the data are comparable on the European scale and are based on representative 
                                                 
4
 Note that we also experimented with kernel matching in order to reduce the variance of the estimates. 
However, kernel matching involves a larger bias than nearest neighbour matching. In our application with 
multiple treatments, kernel matching led to partially imbalanced covariates after the matching. Therefore, we 
stuck to the nearest neighbour approach, as this allows for a smaller bias at the price of a larger asymptotic mean 
squared error, though. 
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samples of firms in the economies. Eurostat presents detailed descriptive survey results for all 
countries and aggregate statistics. The CIS databases contain information on cross-sections of 
firms active in the manufacturing sector and in selected business services. 
In this study, we analyze the above explained research question for a sample of German 
firms, using data from several waves of the MIP that contained a question on the receipt of 
innovation subsidies from the national government and the EU, respectively. Most questions 
of the MIP are asked such that the survey covers a 3-year period. For instance, the MIP 1995 
asks for innovation activities in the period of 1992-1994.  A firm would be asked whether it 
introduced a new product within this 3-year period. In particular, we use the following MIP 
waves: MIP1995 (covering the years 1992-1994), MIP1999 (covering the years 1996-1998), 
MIP2001 (covering the years 1998-2000), MIP2003 (covering the years 2000-2002), 
MIP2004 (covering the years 2001-2003), MIP2005 (covering the years 2002-2004) and 
MIP2007 (covering the years 2004-2006). Moreover, the data has been complemented by 
information collected from patent databases. 
Our sample concerns only innovative firms and covers manufacturing as well as business 
related services sectors. According to the Oslo Manual an innovation is defined as the 
implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a 
new marketing method, or a new organizational method in business practices, workplace 
organization or external relations (see Eurostat and OECD, 2005). Our innovation definition 
focuses on technological innovation, as mere organizational and marketing innovation 
projects are usually not subsidized by governments. Thus, an innovator in this study is a firm 
that either has introduced at least one new or significantly improved product, has introduced a 
new production process, or has attempted to technologically innovate, that is, the firm may 
have either abandoned an innovation project or has at least one ongoing innovation project. 
Table A1 in the appendix shows the industry structure of our sample. In total, the sample 
consists of 8,734 observations, out of which 6,272 observations did not receive any funding at 
all, 1,535 received exclusively national funding, 140 received exclusively EU funding and 
787 received funding from both financial sources. 
Unfortunately, we can use the data only as pooled cross-sections but not as panel. The 
8,734 observations correspond to 6,106 different firms, and 73% of the firms are only 
observed once in our sample. Thus, panel econometric approaches, such as the difference-in-
difference estimator, are ruled out as we would lose the lion‟s share of our sample. 
  
12 
 
Dependent variables 
In the first part of this paper, the main question of the analysis is whether firms‟ innovative 
activities are stimulated by public innovation subsidies, and by the type of funding they are 
receiving. Treatments are indicated by two dummy variables: PFEU indicates that the firm is 
a recipient of a European grant and PFNAT indicates a beneficiary of a national grant. As 
explained in the introduction, the European Commission adopts a mix of innovation policies 
in order to remedy to Europe‟s lagging behind its main competitors. However, in this paper 
we do not differentiate between the various policies of the EU, but we only compare any 
European measure vs. any national measure. Of the full sample, 28.2% of the firms receive 
some kind of public support. Out of these beneficiaries, 5.7% receive only European grants, 
62.3% receive only national grants and 32% receive both R&D activity is measured as R&D 
intensity, RD_INT, being the ratio of internal R&D expenditures to sales (multiplied by 100) 
and total innovation intensity, INNOV_INT, which is the ratio of total innovation expenditure 
to sales (multiplied by 100).
5
  
In the second part of this paper, we are interested in knowing to which extent innovation 
performance varies according to whether or not firms receive subsidies, and the kind of 
subsidy received. We measure innovation performance by three different variables. First, we 
employ a patent dummy indicating whether firm i files at least one patent in year t+1 
(PAT_LEAD_D). Second, the intensity of total innovation sales is used. In the MIP survey, 
firms are asked to indicate what percentage of their total sales is due to new products 
introduced in the period under review. Products may be either entirely new for the respective 
firm‟s main product market or may be products that existed in the market before but are new 
to the firm‟s portfolio. The variable is measured as per cent of innovation sales to total sales 
(TOT_INNO_SALES). Third, we use only the sales due to market novelties as percent of total 
sales (NOV_SALES). Finally, we are interested in knowing whether filed patents got filed 
because the invention was of good quality or because this was a requirement of the funding 
agency. Hence, we evaluate the difference in the average citation per patent between the 
treated and the control group (AV_CIT_PAT). 
                                                 
5
 Total innovation expenditure is defined according to the Oslo Manual (see OECD/Eurostat, 2005) and 
comprises internal and external R&D spending, the purchase of machinery and software for innovation projects, 
purchase of other external knowledge such as patents, licenses and similar intellectual property rights, 
prototyping and similar preparations for production and market introduction, marketing activities in direct 
relation with a new product introduction as well as cost for training of employees directly linked to innovation 
projects. 
 
  
13 
 
Control variables 
We use several control variables in our analysis that might have an impact on whether or not a 
firm receives a subsidy and the origin of the latter as well as on the outcome variables 
mentioned above. Firm size is measured in terms of employment. As the firm size distribution 
is skewed, the variable enters in logarithms (lnEMP). We also allow for a potential non-linear 
relationship by including (lnEMP)
2
. The log of the firm‟s age (lnAGE) is included in the 
analysis as it is often claimed that older firms are more reluctant to pursue innovation. In 
addition, the government maintains special policy schemes for start-up companies which 
make the receipt of funding possibly more likely for younger firms. 
Further we include a dummy variable capturing whether a firm is part of a group (GP) 
such as a multinational company or a holding company for instance, and if so, whether or not 
its headquarters are on national or foreign territory (FOREIGN). The likelihood that firms 
belonging to a group with the parent company on national territory receive a national subsidy 
is presumably higher, given that those might be better informed about public subsidy schemes 
because of network linkages and hence more inclined to apply for them. On similar grounds, 
national governments might favour firms that are part of a group in their decision making 
process when choosing beneficiaries because the latter are more likely to benefit from 
potential spillover effects and specialised know-how from their parents. Similarly, firms 
belonging to groups with a foreign parent company might be more likely to file applications 
in their home country or at the EU level. In addition, governments typically maintain special 
policy instruments for small and medium-sized firms. If a small firm is however majority-
owned by a large parent company, it would no longer qualify for most SME-programs and 
hence the likelihood to receive a subsidy, at least at the national level, is reduced. The 
dummies GP and FOREIGN thus also control for this type of company profile, and, ex-ante, it 
is unclear whether one should expect a positive or a negative effect because of the two 
opposing arguments outlined above. 
Furthermore, we also account for capital intensity. As a matter of fact, it is desirable to 
control for different technologies used in the production process, as capital-intensive 
production might rely more heavily on innovation activities than labour-intensive firms, and 
might already have more previous experience in conducting R&D projects. The variable is 
measured as fixed assets relative to employment (CAPINT = fixed assets/EMP). 
Previous experience in successful R&D activities plays a vital role when applying for 
public support, as governments often adopt a picking-the-winner strategy and hence might 
favour firms with previous success stories. 
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Therefore, we include the patent stock (PS) in our regression.The patent stock enters into 
the regression as patent stock per employee to avoid potential multicollinearity with firm size 
(PS/EMP). Even though “not all inventions are patentable” and “not all inventions are 
patented” (Griliches, 1990, p.10), the patent stock is the best approximation we have for past 
innovation activities as data on previous R&D expenditures are not available. The patent 
stock information stem from the EPO dataset and are computed as a time series of patent 
applications with a 15% rate of obsolescence of knowledge capital, as is common in the 
literature (see e.g. Jaffe, 1986; Hall, 1990; Griliches and Mairesse, 1984):  
PSi,t = PSi,t-1×0.85 + patentapplicationsi,t. 
In addition to past successful innovation, the current innovation potential clearly depends on 
the firm‟s current ability to engage in R&D activities. This, as well as administrative know-
how, is controlled for by a dummy taking the value of 1 if a firm has an internal R&D 
department (RDLAB).  
Furthermore, we include the export intensity (EXPORT = sales abroad / total sales) to 
measure the degree of international competition a firm faces. Firms that are active in foreign 
markets may be more innovative than the ones serving only nationally and possibly more 
likely to apply for subsidies.  
We also account for the price-cost margin. We approximate it empirically as introduced 
by Collins and Preston (1969) and Ravenscraft (1983) [PCM = (sales –staff cost – material 
costs) / sales]. PCM accounts for the availability of internal funds. It has been pointed out in 
the literature that the major financial resource for innovation projects are internal funds, as 
firms might suffer from financial constraints in the private credit market. Potential lenders 
may be less willing to finance R&D when compared to investments into fixed assets because 
of the higher uncertainty of returns and lower inside collateral values as R&D is immediately 
sunk when expensed (see e.g. Hall and Lerner, 2010, or Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2010, for 
recent surveys of this strand of literature). 
Finally, we also include a dummy variable taking on the value of 1 if a firm is based in 
the Eastern part of Germany (EAST). Eastern German firms benefit from special conditions in 
terms of public support since Eastern Germanyis subject to the transformation from a planned 
economy to a market economy after the German re-unification in 1990. Last but not least, 
industry dummies control for unobserved heterogeneity across sectors (see Table A1 for the 
definition of industries) and time dummies capture macroeconomic shocks. 
As there are missing values for some of the variables, we created dummy variables equal 
to 1 if the values were missing instead of imputing them with the help of a mean or of 
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information from other years. Imputing a zero for the missing values once the dummy is 
included in the analysis allows us to capture the bias arising from this transformation in the 
estimated slopes of the concerned variables. This technique has been used to account for 
missing values in the capital intensity variable (D(CAPINT = missing)) and the PCM variable 
(D(PCM= missing)). 
Timing of variables 
As mentioned above, each wave of the survey covers a three-year period. In order to avoid 
endogeneity between the dependent variables and the covariates to the largest extent, we 
employ lagged values wherever possible. For instance, suppose the dependent variables are 
measured in period t. Then lnEMP, CAPINT, PS/EMP, PCM and EXPORT are measured at 
the beginning of the survey period, i.e. in t-2.  
The information on RDLAB, GP and FOREIGN is only available such that the question 
covers the whole 3-year period, i.e. t-2 to t. For instance, “Did your firm maintain an own, 
internal R&D department during 1996-1998?” We consider AGE as truly exogenous and 
hence it is measured in period t and the variable EAST is time-invariant. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 displays the mean values for all variables for all the envisaged cases of our 
analysis. In other words, we compare the mean values of unsubsidized firms with the mean 
values of EU funded firms, of nationally funded firms and of firms that are funded by both 
funding sources. Furthermore, we compare the means of firms that get exclusively EU funds 
with firms that get exclusively national funds. As can be seen in Table 3, all of our groups 
differ significantly among each other in the dependent variables as well as in the covariates. 
For instance, firms receiving subsidies from both funding sources are on average larger, have 
more patents per employee, are more likely to have an internal R&D lab, are younger, more 
export-oriented, and are more likely to be associated with a group than firms that do not get 
any subsidies. 
These differences are also present when comparing non-subsidized firms with firms that 
get subsidies only from one funding source (with the exception of age with regard to firms 
that get only EU funding). When comparing characteristics of firms that get only national 
funding with firms that get only EU funding, we see that the latter tend to be larger, belonging 
to a group more often with a foreign parent company and are more export-oriented than the 
former. They further tend to be older.  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
  I II III IV I vs. II I vs. III I vs. IV III vs. IV II vs. IV II vs. III 
  
Unsubsidized 
firms, N = 6,272 
Subsidized firms 
from EU and 
national sources,  
N = 787 
Subsidized firms, 
only national 
sources, N = 1,535 
Subsidized firms, 
only European 
sources, N = 140 
p-values of t-test on mean differences 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
 
 
      Covariates 
lnEMP 4.453 1.705 5.212 2.429 4.551 1.627 5.526 1.708 p<0.001 p=0.036 p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.063 p<0.001 
CAPINT 0.041 0.110 0.048 0.091 0.043 0.078 0.056 0.171 p=0.055 p=0.547 p=0.301 p=0.352 p=0.575 p=0.163 
D(CAPINT = missing) 0.296 0.456 0.188 0.391 0.169 0.375 0.171 0.378 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.951 p=0.634 p=0.269 
PS/EMP 0.013 0.039 0.035 0.065 0.030 0.064 0.023 0.047 p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.009 p=0.111 p=0.012 p=0.093 
PCM 0.261 0.228 0.192 0.247 0.179 0.246 0.183 0.260 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.856 p=0.685 p=0.203 
D(PCM = missing) 0.283 0.451 0.180 0.385 0.154 0.361 0.143 0.351 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.711 p=0.252 p=0.115 
RDLAB 0.350 0.477 0.761 0.427 0.568 0.496 0.557 0.499 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.804 p<0.001 p<0.001 
GP 0.478 0.500 0.569 0.495 0.420 0.494 0.586 0.494 p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.012 p<0.001 p=0.717 p<0.001 
FOREIGN 0.101 0.302 0.079 0.270 0.085 0.279 0.200 0.401 p=0.029 p=0.047 p=0.004 p=0.001 p<0.001 p=0.583 
lnAGE 3.032 1.048 2.794 1.032 2.688 1.029 3.021 1.147 p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.909 p=0.001 p=0.029 p=0.019 
EXPORT 0.166 0.234 0.299 0.290 0.226 0.255 0.302 0.274 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.001 p=0.913 p<0.001 
EAST 0.223 0.416 0.422 0.494 0.540 0.499 0.221 0.417 p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.974 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 
  Outcome variables (part I) 
INNOV_INT 5.844 10.336 18.112 21.775 12.015 15.595 9.333 16.020 p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.011 p=0.059 p<0.001 p<0.001 
RD_INT 2.227 5.740 13.401 19.365 7.512 12.229 5.204 10.971 p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.001 p=0.019 p<0.001 p<0.001 
  Outcome variables (part II)6 
NOV_SALES 6.740 15.190 12.703 20.491 9.413 16.990 8.024 15.440 p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.373 p=0.356 p=0.004 p=0.004 
TOT_INNO_SALES 26.806 28.172 38.178 29.300 40.980 30.267 30.702 26.761 p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.121 p=0.001 p=0.006 p=0.049 
PAT_LEAD_D 0.125 0.331 0.261 0.439 0.223 0.416 0.296 0.458 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.096 p=0.429 p=0.071 
AV_CIT_PAT 0.036 0.269 0.102 0.438 0.116 0.609 0.069 0.351 p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.323 p=0.195 p=0.366 p=0.548 
 
                                                 
6
 Note that the sample sizes of part II differ from the ones in part I because of some missing values in the four additional outcome variables. In this part the sample sizes 
correspond to: I: N=4,888, II: N=664, II: N=1,246 and IV: N=118 respectively.   
  
17 
 
Some results of the descriptive statistics suggest that public agencies seem to follow a 
picking-the-winner strategy, as subsidized firms have more experience in innovation 
activities, have more capacities and capabilities (as approximated by the variables patent 
stock, firm size and the indicator on having an own internal R&D department). 
The outcome variables, namely internal R&D intensity and total innovation expenditure, 
differ significantly between all the cases under review. Compared to unsubsidized groups, the 
subsidized groups always have higher R&D and innovation intensity. This also holds for the 
innovation performance measures that will be used as outcome variables in the second part of 
the study (with the exception of market novelties in the case of unsubsidized vs. on EU 
subsidies (I vs. IV) and only national vs. only EU funds (III vs. IV)). Subsidized firms, 
irrespectively of the source, are also more likely to file patents in the future and their patents 
have more forward citations, on average The econometric analysis will reveal to what extent 
these differences can be attributed to the different treatments. 
4. Empirical results 
In order to apply the matching estimator as outlined in the previous section, we first estimate a 
seemingly unrelated probit model on national and European funding (see Table 4). From this 
estimation, we obtain the predicted probabilities (the propensity scores) to be employed as 
matching arguments subsequently.  
On first sight, one can conclude from the Probit estimates that basically the same 
variables are significant in both equations and thus that the European and national agencies 
have very similar selection criteria. Having a closer look at the magnitude of the coefficients, 
or more precisely, the differences in magnitudes of the coefficients across equations, we find 
indeed find indications for different selection behaviours. For instance, the coefficients of the 
patent stock per employee differ significantly among equations (Wald test: 2(1) = 11.40, p-
value < 0.01), that is, the national funding agencies react more sensitively to prior innovation 
experience than European authorities when selecting recipients. Similarly, the PCM is more 
important for national funding than for EU funding (2(1) = 7.99, p-value < 0.01). Thus, 
national agencies seem to pay more attention to the R&D capabilities and private financial 
resources than the European agencies. We do not find significant differences in any other 
coefficients across equations except for EAST (2(1) = 93.29, p-value < 0.01), which possibly 
reflects special national efforts to foster the transformation process in Eastern Germany. 
Finally, note that the marginal effects of firm size, lnEMP and its squared term, differ 
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somewhat between national and EU funding. The estimated curves describe a U-shaped 
relationship between the subsidy receipt and firm size. Plotting the estimated probabilities 
depending on firm size shows that both curves exhibit quite a similar shape until the firm size 
reaches about 150 employees. Then, however, the EU curve has a steeper slope indicating that 
firm size after a certain threshold becomes more important for EU funding than for national 
funding. 
Table 4: Seemingly unrelated probit estimations on European (PFEU) and national funding 
(PFNAT) (8,734 obs.) 
 
PFEU PFNAT 
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
lnEMP -0.208 *** 0.046 -0.185 *** 0.039 
(lnEMP)
2
 0.037 *** 0.004 0.028 *** 0.004 
CAPINT 0.323 * 0.169 0.152  0.150 
D(CAPINT = missing) -0.042  0.064 -0.093 * 0.052 
PS/EMP 1.678 *** 0.356 2.978 *** 0.325 
PCM -0.281 *** 0.082 -0.520 *** 0.070 
D(PCM = missing) -0.115 * 0.067 -0.115 ** 0.055 
RDLAB 0.467 *** 0.045 0.550 *** 0.036 
GP 0.001  0.047 -0.017  0.038 
FOREIGN -0.200 *** 0.069 -0.288 *** 0.059 
lnAGE -0.102 *** 0.022 -0.086 *** 0.018 
EXPORT 0.484 *** 0.089 0.451 *** 0.076 
EAST 0.461 *** 0.046 0.923 *** 0.038 
Intercept -1.330 *** 0.183 -1.151 *** 0.154 
Test on joint significance of industry 
dummies 
2(11) = 97.39*** 2(11) = 153.84*** 
Test on joint significance of time dummies 
2
(6) = 31.30*** 2(6) =  99.50*** 
 (= correlation of equations„ error terms) 0.734*** (std. err. = 0.015) 
Note: *** (**,*) indicates a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).  
 
As expected, the correlation coefficient  is significantly different from zero. Indeed, 
national and European funding are linked to each other. In other words, if an external shock 
were to augment the probability of getting national subsidies, it would have also an effect on 
European subsidies. As  is positive, a positive shock in the probability of getting a national 
subsidy would also translate into a positive shock on the likelihood of EU grant receipts. 
As explained in the previous section, a necessary precondition for the matching estimator 
to be applicable is sufficient common support, meaning sufficient overlap between the 
propensity scores. In the methodology of Gerfin and Lechner (2002) it is natural that for some 
cases under review (see Table 1) many treated observations have to be dropped, as one 
searches for controls in sometimes relatively small samples. Confer, for instance, case 1 in 
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Table 1. There we have a sample of 1,535 treated observations and we would search in a 
potential control group of 6,272 observations. We would thus expect that we lose only a few 
treated observations because of the common support restriction. In contrast, the cases 6, 8 and 
9 would require searching 787, 6,272 and 1,535 observations in a potential control group of 
only 140 observations (firms that got only EU funding). As this obviously appears to result in 
poor matches, these cases cannot be evaluated with our data, and are thus not considered for 
any further analysis. For the remaining cases, Table 5 lists the size of the treated groups and 
their respective control groups, as well as the number of treated observations dropped because 
of the common support restriction and our imposed caliper threshold serving as maximum 
tolerance. We chose a threshold of 0.1 in order to match as precise and as balanced as 
possible. With this threshold, all of our covariates are perfectly balanced after the matching. 
Note however that the matching results were not affected by this. The impact of the various 
treatments was the same for all tested thresholds, even if we allowed the distance between 
matched pairs to be larger in order not to lose as many observations as displayed in Table 5 or 
if we did not impose a maximum distance at all. 
Table 5: Observations lost due to common support and the threshold (“caliper”) imposed on 
maximum distance 
Case 
Sample size  
of treated obs. 
Sample size  
of control group 
# of observations lost 
due to common support 
restrictions (in %) 
# of observations 
excluded due to caliper 
restriction (in %) 
1 1,535 6,272 5 (0.3) 132 (8.6) 
2 140 6,272 2 (1.4) 18 (12.9) 
3 787 6,272 45 (5.7) 328 (41.7) 
4 140 1,535 2 (1.4) 50 (35.7) 
5 787 1,535 40 (5.1) 305 (38.8) 
7 6,272 1,535 220 (3.5) 842 (13.4) 
10 6,272 787 363 (5.8) 2,564 (40.9) 
11 1,535 787 3 (0.2) 624 (40.7) 
12 140 787 1 (0.7) 74 (52.9) 
Note: Cases 6, 8 and 9 have been dropped for further analysis as the control group size (140 obs.) is not 
sufficient for a meaningful application of the matching estimator. 
 
In order to assess the success of the matching routine as outlined before, we re-estimate a 
probit model on the respective treatment indicator defined for each case using the matched 
pairs. If the matching has been successful, one would expect that a test on overall model 
significance would not reject the null hypothesis that all coefficients in the regression of the 
treatment indicator on all the covariates are jointly zero. Table A2 in the appendix reports the 
overall significance of our probit models after the matching for all considered cases. As the 
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test statistics point out, the treatment group and the selected control group are all well 
balanced in the covariates after the matching for all cases considered here.  
4.1 Subsidy effect on R&D and innovation intensity 
As previously outlined, we pick the nearest neighbour for each firm to be evaluated. Table 6 
presents the matching results for our sample. The various cases in Table 6 relate to the cases 
presented in Table 1. As is shown by the results, all estimated treatment effects are 
significantly different from zero. Note that we drew a single nearest neighbour for all cases, 
but 2 and 12. The cases 2, 4, and 12 consider only 140 treated observations. When we drew a 
single nearest neighbour the results suffered to some extent from small sample sizes. 
Therefore we also explored the results when drawing two instead of a single nearest 
neighbour. It turned out that the results improved for cases 2 and 12, i.e., we obtained smaller 
standard errors. In case 4, however, we found that drawing two neighbours led to significantly 
worse matches as the control group was not rich enough to supply two close neighbours for 
several treated firms. Consequently, we drew two neighbours for cases 2 and 12, but stuck to 
one nearest neighbour for case 4 as for all the remaining cases. 
It can be seen in cases 1 to 3 that getting subsidies (be it from national sources, from EU 
sources or from both sources cumulated) has a positive effect on R&D and innovation 
intensity of the recipient firms compared to not getting subsidies at all. For all 3 cases the 
outcome variables are significant at a 1% level and the null hypothesis of full crowding out 
can hence be rejected. 
Cases 7 and 10 consider the opposite case, that is, a “treatment on the untreated”. These 
two cases ask the question whether non-subsidized firms would have benefitted from a 
treatment if they had gotten a subsidy from either national sources or both national and 
European sources. Here we find significant negative results, i.e. non-funded firms would have 
indeed invested more into R&D and innovation if they had gotten public support. 
While the above mentioned results are in line with most of the literature discussed in 
Section 2, we now turn to the more interesting and not yet investigated cases so far, that is, the 
different impacts of heterogeneous treatments within beneficiaries of different policies. The 
cases 4 and 5, for instance, benchmark the impact of EU policies compared to national 
policies. Interestingly, we indeed find treatment effects that are significantly different from 
zero. In case 4, it turns out that recipients of EU funding invest more into both R&D and 
innovation when compared to the counterfactual of receiving a subsidy from national sources. 
In case 5, a similar result is obtained. When national subsidies are combined with EU money, 
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the recipients also invest more than in the counterfactual situation of only getting a national 
subsidy.  
Accordingly, we also find significant treatment effects in cases 11 and 12 where we 
investigate whether non-recipients would have potentially benefitted from a different 
treatment. Firms that actually got only national funding would have benefitted from 
supplemental EU grants with regard to their R&D and innovation input. Likewise, firms that 
got only EU funding would have benefitted from additional national grants. 
Table 6: Matching results: Subsidy effect on R&D and innovation intensity 
Dependent variable: R&D Intensity (R&D expenditures/sales × 100) 
  Actual status (m) 
 
  No funding 
Only national 
funding 
Only EU 
funding 
Funding from both 
sources 
C
o
u
n
te
rf
a
ct
u
a
l 
(l
) No funding 
 
case 1 
3.312*** 
case 2 
2.141** 
case 3 
8.396*** 
Only national 
funding 
case 7 
-2.140***  
case 4 
3.855** 
case 5 
3.895*** 
Only EU funding case 8 case 9 
 
case 6 
Funding from both 
sources 
case 10 
-6.448*** 
case 11 
-4.615*** 
case 12 
-8.245***  
Dependent variable: Innovation Intensity (Innovation expenditures/sales × 100) 
  Actual status (m) 
C
o
u
n
te
rf
a
ct
u
a
l 
(l
) 
 
 
No funding 
Only national 
funding 
Only EU 
funding 
Funding from both 
sources 
No funding 
 
case 1 
3.340*** 
case 2 
2.959** 
case 3 
8.724*** 
Only national 
funding 
case 7 
-2.734***  
case 4 
2.782** 
case 5 
3.906** 
Only EU funding 
case 8 case 9 
 
case 6 
Funding from both 
sources 
case 10 
-6.803*** 
case 11 
-4.896*** 
case 12 
-5.501***  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** (**, *) indicates a 1% (5%, 10%) significance level. Standard 
errors are obtained with Lechners (1999) asymptotic approximation correcting for replicated observations due to 
sampling with replacement.  
 
Acknowledging that public subsidies have an enhancing effect on R&D and innovation 
expenditures, comparing the origin of funding allows us to conclude that getting subsidies 
from both sources combined has the highest effect on R&D and innovation intensity. 
Intuitively, this could be expected, as adding together multiple grants results in higher 
resources for innovative activities. What was however much less clear a-priori, was to know 
whether subsidies originating from European funds or subsidies originating from national 
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funds have a higher effect on R&D and innovation investment. In case 4, we find that the EU 
grants yield higher treatment effects than the national grants. This could have two reasons. 
Either the EU grants are higher in terms of the size of the amounts distributed, on average, or 
actually involve different mechanisms within the policy instruments; for instance, the 
technical and administrative requirements of EU subsidies might be such that only the firms 
that are most likely to top up the grant with private money more substantially comply. Thus, it 
could be the case that the EU agencies apply a more effective selection process when grant 
decisions are taken. In order to investigate whether the R&D and innovation efforts also differ 
in productivity among different grant recipients, we now turn to the second part of our 
research questions where innovation performance is considered. 
4.2. Subsidy effect on innovation performance 
Before presenting the results of the impact of the subsidies on innovation performance, Table 
7 summarizes again how many observations are lost because of the common support 
condition and the caliper threshold. Note that the numbers of the initial sample sizes differ 
here as we lose some observations because of missing values in the four outcome variables 
considered in this exercise. We do not just pick one control observation for each treated firm 
in this setting, but we allow for two controls for each treated firm.  
Table 7: Observations lost due to common support and the threshold (“caliper”) imposed on 
maximum distance (innovation performance analysis) 
Case 
Sample size  
of treated obs. 
Sample size  
of control group 
# of observations lost due to 
common support 
restrictions (in %) 
# of observations excluded 
due to caliper restriction (in 
%) 
1 1,246 4,888 14 (1.1) 318 (25.5) 
2 118 4,888 2 (1.7) 24 (23.5) 
3 664 4,888 36 (5.4) 360 (54.2) 
4 118 1,246 1 (0.8) 53 (44.9) 
5 664 1,246 29 (4.3) 343 (51.7) 
7 4,888 1,246 158 (3.2) 1,039 (21.3) 
10 4,888 664 259 (5.2) 2,106 (43.1) 
11 1,246 664 2 (0.1) 611 (49.0) 
12 118 664 2 (1.7) 55 (46.6) 
Note: Cases 6, 8 and 9 have been dropped for further analysis as the control group size (118obs.) is not sufficient 
for a meaningful application of the matching estimator. 
 
Table 8 presents the matching results for our sample on innovation performance, proxied 
by total innovation sales and market novelties, which we measure as the share of innovative 
products in general (resp. market novelties) sold in terms of total turnover. We further use a 
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dummy variable on future patent application as an outcome variable, indicating whether firm i 
will file at least one patent in year t+1 as well as forward citations per patent. 
At this stage it is vital to underline that to conduct this estimation we do not only match 
on the two propensity scores as we did in the previous sub-section, but we also include 
innovation input, i.e. total innovation intensity which includes R&D expenditure, as a 
matching criterion. This is done in order to hold total innovation expenditures constant 
between the firms in state m and the firms in state l. In other words, even if firms get funding 
from two sources, the firms in the counterfactual group will be chosen such that their total 
innovation investment is basically the same as the one of the firms in the actual state. The 
only difference between both groups is hence the criteria they had to fulfil to obtain the one, 
the other or both grants. As a consequence this allows us to evaluate whether the selection 
criteria of the funding agencies are such that for a given amount of money invested in 
innovation projects, the chosen candidates show superior results. If this is the case, one could 
conclude that those firms have indeed the better R&D projects as well as the means and 
experience to successfully accomplish them, and that as a consequence, funding agencies 
adopt a successful picking-the-winner strategy with regard to the eventual innovation output, 
and not only the input. As the matching gets somewhat more complex by adding a further 
matching argument, we set the maximum distance allowed, i.e. the caliper restriction, to a 
value of 0.3. 
Comparing firms that only get national grants with the counterfactual situation of getting 
no grant at all (case 1), we do not find any significant result in terms of sales of market 
novelties or total innovation sales (without differentiating between firm or market novelties). 
When considering our dummy variable on future patenting, however, we find that nationally 
funded firms will patent more in year t+1 than in the counterfactual situation with no public 
support.
7
 We also find that non-recipients would benefit from a national subsidy receipt with 
regard to future patent applications and total innovation sales (cf. case 7).  
When comparing firms that receive only European funding with firms that receive no 
funding (case 2), we do not find any significant results. However, when comparing firms that 
got funded from both sources with not funded firms (case 3), we find that the funded firms are 
significantly more likely to patent in t+1 than their counterfactuals. 
                                                 
7
 Even though we do not report these results in a detailed table, if considering patent leads in absolute 
numbers (and not as a dummy variable), we find that the funded firms will file twice as many patents per 1000 
employees than in the counterfactual situation of not receiving subsidies at a significance level of 5%. 
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Table 8: Matching results: Subsidy effect on innovation performance 
Dependent variable: Sold market novelties (NOV_SALES) 
  Actual status (m) 
 
  No funding 
Only national 
funding 
Only EU funding 
Funding from 
both sources 
C
o
u
n
te
rf
a
ct
u
a
l 
(l
) No funding  
case 1 
 -0.448 
case 2 
 -1.451 
case 3 
0.900 
Only national 
funding 
case 7 
0.102  
case 4 
-1.948 
case 5 
4.544*** 
Only EU funding case 8 case 9 
 
case 6 
Funding from 
both sources 
case 10 
 -3.108** 
case 11 
 -5.060*** 
case 12 
 -5.787**  
Dependent variable: Sold products that are new to the firm (TOT_INNO_SALES) 
  Actual status (m) 
 
 
No funding 
Only national 
funding 
Only EU funding 
Funding from 
both sources 
C
o
u
n
te
rf
a
ct
u
a
l 
(l
) No funding  
case 1 
2.139 
case 2 
-1.982 
case 3 
 -2.215 
Only national 
funding 
case 7 
 -3.110**  
case 4 
 -10.574** 
case 5 
3.211 
Only EU funding case 8 case 9 
 
case 6 
Funding from 
both sources 
case 10 
 -3.033 
case 11 
-2.356 
case 12 
 -6.686 
  
Dependent variable: Patent lead dummy (PAT_LEAD_D) 
  Actual status (m) 
 
 
No funding 
Only national 
funding 
Only EU funding 
Funding from 
both sources 
C
o
u
n
te
rf
a
ct
u
a
l 
(l
) No funding  
case 1 
0.046** 
case 2 
0.043 
case 3 
0.070** 
Only national 
funding 
case 7 
-0.069***  
case 4 
-0.047 
case 5 
-0.015 
Only EU funding case 8 case 9 
 
case 6 
Funding from 
both sources 
case 10 
-0.134*** 
case 11 
-0.064 
case 12 
-0.088 
  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** (**, *) indicates a 1% (5%, 10%) significance level. Standard 
errors are obtained with Lechner‟s (1999) asymptotic approximation correcting for replicated observations due to 
sampling with replacement.  
 
An interesting and rather unexpected result in light of our previous findings is given by 
case 4. Even though we find in our preceding analysis that firms that get solely EU funds 
invest more in R&D and innovation than in the counterfactual situation of getting solely 
national funds, we do not see a superior innovation performance. When keeping the 
investment constant, we find a significant negative result in terms of total innovation sales. 
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This means that, compared to the counterfactual situation where the firms would receive only 
national money, they sell less new products in the case of an EU treatment.  
When evaluating the treatment effect for firms that get funding from both sources to the 
counterfactual of only getting national funding (case 5), we only find a positive effect for 
sales with market novelties.  
We find strong evidence that firms would benefit from a combination of EU and national 
grants with respect to their sales of market novelties, even if they already receive some 
subsidies (cf. cases 10, 11, and 12). In terms of market novelties, we find that firms that solely 
get EU funds would also benefit from getting national grants in addition (case 12), and in 
terms of patent leads that firms not receiving a treatment would benefit from combined 
support (case 10). 
Summarizing the results of this exercise on innovation performance, we can conclude on 
various aspects. We match on the propensity to receive funding from national and EU sources 
and also hold the innovation input constant (the total innovation intensity is added as an 
additional matching criterion). If we consider the evidence on the future patent applications as 
successful technology developments, it turns out that firms that received funding from 
national resources (either solely or in combination with an EU grant) patent more than in the 
counterfactual situation of getting no subsidy. This result is supplemented by the fact that 
firms not receiving any grant would be more likely to patent if they had received a national 
grant and those that only got EU funding would be more likely to patent if they had gotten a 
national grant in addition. As these results are obtained by holding the innovation input 
constant, and hence firms only differ in the treatment receipt, the analysis suggests that 
recipients of German national grants actually follow the subsidy guideline: in the major 
German policy schemes, e.g. the mission-orientated innovation funding, firms are indeed 
encouraged to utilize their research results by filing patent application, for instance. This 
implies, in turn, that the funding agencies picked the “right” firms in their selection procedure. 
If firms are encouraged to apply for patents due to a grant receipt, and we actually find here 
that this is the case, we can indirectly conclude that the government picked firms that were 
technologically capable enough to generate patentable inventions as desired by policy makers.  
The results on patenting motivated us to explore this innovation output in some more 
detail. As we stated above, the German government advices firms to utilize their obtained 
research results. “Utilization” could be best demonstrated by a patent application. Thus, firms 
may be more likely to patent when the corresponding research was undertaken within a 
subsidized project. If so, our results on patenting would simply reflect this behaviour and not 
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necessarily superior technological developments. In order to investigate this phenomenon 
further, we collected the number of average forward citations per patent, that is, the number of 
future applications referring to the patent in question as relevant prior art. Forward citations 
are typically interpreted as proxy for the “importance”, the “quality” or the “significance” of a 
patented invention. Previous studies have shown that forward citations are highly correlated 
with the social value (Trajtenberg, 1990) and the private value of the patented invention 
(Harhoff et al., 1999, Hall et al., 2005). Furthermore, forward citations reflect the economic 
and technological “importance” as perceived by the inventors themselves (Jaffe et al., 2000) 
and knowledgeable peers in the technology domain (Albert et al., 1991).
8
 
We use the number of citations received in a 5-year window after the filing date as a new 
dependent variable in our matching analysis. Consider for instance case 1: if we now find that 
the patents of nationally subsidized firms actually receive lesser citations than in the 
counterfactual situation of getting no subsidies, it would mean that firms may simply file 
patents for complying with the advice of the funding agency concerning the utilization of 
research results without actually displaying superior technological developments to other 
R&D projects. If, however, we find that these patents receive more citations, on average, we 
can conclude that firms are not only more likely to apply for patents in the future, but actually 
created valuable technology within the funded research projects that otherwise may not have 
existed. 
The results of the citation analysis for our complete set of cases are presented in Table 9. 
Although not every finding of the patent dummy analysis (cf. Table 8) is confirmed (case 7 is 
not confirmed), we find evidence that subsidies lead to superior technology developments 
(cases 1 and 3). In addition, firms that do not get funding could be expected to invent better 
technology if they were funded by a combination of national and European grants (case 10), 
all else constant (including the innovation budgets of the firms). We thus conclude that the 
findings for the patent dummy are not just an indication that firms comply with the public 
agencies‟ guidelines, but that they indeed develop valuable technology. 
                                                 
8
 See Czarnitzki et al. (2011) for a recent validation of different economic proxy variables derived from 
patent information. 
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Table 9: Matching results: average number of forward citations per patent 
 Dependent variable: Average citation per patent (AV_CIT_PAT).) 
  Actual status (m) 
 
 
No funding 
Only national 
funding 
Only EU 
funding 
Funding from 
both sources 
C
o
u
n
te
rf
a
ct
u
a
l 
(l
) No funding 
 
case 1 
0.041* 
case 2 
-0.038 
case 3 
0.064** 
Only national 
funding 
case 7 
-0.039  
case 4 
-0.101 
case 5 
-0.031 
Only EU funding case 8 case 9 
 
case 6 
Funding from both 
sources 
case 10 
-0.081** 
case 11 
0.015 
case 12 
-0.072 
  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** (**, *) indicates a 1% (5%, 10%) significance level. Standard 
errors are obtained with Lechner‟s (1999) asymptotic approximation correcting for replicated observations due to 
sampling with replacement. 
 
Our results concerning the two innovation product sales variables are somewhat less 
informative than the patent analysis (see Table 8). Although we find significant evidence for 
some cases that we considered, no clear conclusion on successful product implementation can 
be drawn. To some extent this may not be surprising as we hold the innovation input constant 
in this analysis. Thus, the good news is that firms funded by either source do not achieve 
lower product sales when compared to a counterfactual outcome of no or other treatments. We 
can thus conclude that subsidized R&D projects are not less productive than purely privately 
financed projects. These findings are in line with Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004), Czarnitzki 
and Licht (2006) as well as Hussinger (2008). 
However, we do not find clear evidence that firms would introduce more successful 
products with the same innovation budgets when their innovation process is guided by certain 
criteria that have to be respected when public money is received, e.g. systematic accounting of 
expenses which might increase the process efficiency within organization, systematic 
reporting duties which might influence the project management positively or may increase the 
focus of the corresponding innovation efforts and so forth. Of course, our data may not allow 
identifying such long-term innovation success because of the cross-sectional nature of our 
data. While we were able to use leads of the patent activity, the data on product sales does not 
allow for enough time from innovation input to output. Basically we control for innovation 
budget in period t and relate public funding in a three year period (t-2 to t) to the innovation 
performance in period t. Although the innovation input in period t may proxy past innovation 
to a satisfactory extent, it could still be the case that the innovation performance in terms of 
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sales only evolves after longer time lags which we cannot take into account with the given 
data.  
Between not funded firms and EU funded firms, our estimation did not yield any 
significant results for any of the three performance variables. Comparing national and EU 
funding though, we did find significant superiority of nationally funded firms compared to EU 
funded firms in terms of total innovation sales.  
The reason why we do not find any superior project outcome because of EU policy might 
be a reflection of different policy priorities in EU and national programs (see a more detailed 
program description Appendix A). The Cohesion Fund, which encompasses the largest 
investment of the three main EU instruments, has as a main objective the “Convergence 
Objective”, consisting of getting depressed German regions up to the German and EU 
standards, in order to get all the regions to successfully compete on the internal market. 
Hence, the goal of this policy is not a “picking-the-winner” one, but rather an “aiding-the-
poor” one. In this light, our results are actually good news for such policy programs. The 
recipient firms do not lag behind other firms in terms of innovation performance. The second 
largest EU tool consists in the framework program. As explained in appendix 2, many of the 
framework activities consist in promoting researchers‟ mobility, networking activities and 
other “soft skills‟” development. As a consequence, the results might not be measurable (at 
least not in the short run) in terms of market output or patent activities. However, even if these 
projects trigger less private benefits they might exhibit larger longer term impacts as well as 
larger social benefits than the national investments. Our findings that EU grants stimulate 
larger R&D and innovation investment, hence seem to be in line with the pursed objectives of 
the respective funding agencies. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper analyses the impact of different types of subsidies on R&D expenditures and total 
innovation intensity as well as on innovation performance. Unlike most other related studies 
in the literature, where the main interest is evaluating whether one faces crowding out of 
private investment through public support, we evaluate what the impact of national vs., or in 
combination with, European subsidies are on our outcome variables. Indeed, evaluating 
national subsidies in isolation of EU subsidies could be erroneous and could trigger 
misleading conclusions. Given that implementing bodies of EU instruments exist at different 
levels (supranational, national, sub-national), policy programs are governed by different 
logics (e.g. excellence vs. cohesion) and mix with national policies, estimating actual policy 
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coherence and impacts appears to be a major challenge. Hence, EU Member States try to 
combine national and EU policies in the most efficient way in order to close the gap between 
Europe and some of its main competitors in terms of innovation investment and in terms of 
catching up on technological progress.  
In order to evaluate the impact of the current policy mix in the most accurate way, we 
employ caliper matching to firm level data from Germany to account for a potential selection 
bias. Matching on two propensity scores, we analyze 9 out of 12 different possible cases of 
grant combinations. Our main finding is that both EU grants and national grants, as well as 
the combination of both, lead to higher innovation input in the economy when compared to a 
situation where these policies would be absent, i.e. the counterfactual where the recipient 
firms would not be funded. In addition, we find that EU grants compared to national grants 
have a higher effect on innovation input which can possibly explained by a larger average 
grant amount. Hence, full crowding out can be rejected for both types of grants.   
With regards to innovation performance, we find evidence that publicly funded firms do 
not perform worse when compared to a counterfactual where the recipient firms would have 
the same innovation budgets without receiving subsidies. Keeping innovation investment 
constant allows us to indirectly conclude that the granted research projects have a similar 
productivity as purely privately funded projects. In terms of products sold that are new to the 
market, we find that firms that receive funding from both sources have the highest sales. We 
further find that firms that do not get subsidies or get subsidies from either one of the sources 
would invest more if they had a top-up from the other source. In terms of total innovation 
sales, we find superiority of national grants when compared to a counterfactual of no grants or 
EU grants. However, when interpreting our results, one has to bear in mind that given the 
short lag between the receipt of a subsidy and the development of a new product imposed by 
our data, it is possible that the economic contribution of some innovations may not yet have 
fully materialized. 
In terms of future patents filed, we find that nationally funded firms (only national or in 
combination with EU funds) are more likely apply for patents in period t+1. This finding that 
national subsidies (and the combination of national and EU subsidies) seem to be successful is 
not only reassuring in the light of current policy tools, but also in the light of future policy 
projects. Indeed, the objective in Germany is to increasingly deliver public support from the 
EU through existing national channels. This is at least the case for the investment stemming 
from the cohesion fund, which is the most important one and where the goal is linking the 
structural funds closer to the national policy in the future in order to use it rather as an 
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additional support of national funding than as a complement to the latter (see Taylor et al., 
2000, for more details on Structural Fund Project Decision-Making Systems). Given our 
findings, we can conclude that this approach seems to be a promising one. In addition, we can 
conclude that in case of German funding, the agencies picked the firms able to comply with 
the requirement to utilize their research results, e.g. by filing patents. Evaluating the average 
forward citations per patent in a 5-year window allows us furthermore to conclude that they 
do not only patent because it is advised by the funding authorities, but that their technological 
developments are of high quality.  
For future research, it would be useful to have access to more complete panel data, 
allowing for more time between innovation input and the potential innovation output in order 
to evaluate the effectiveness of the additional innovation input triggered by subsidies from 
different sources. Furthermore, it would be interesting to have more detailed information of 
the respective selection processes of national and European beneficiaries in order to be able to 
draw more precise conclusions from the econometric results. Ideally, the synergy, 
complementarity or supplementary of these policies should be estimated at the regional level, 
preferably by type of company or type of beneficiary. In a similar vein, having data allowing 
to do a similar exercise but differentiating between the various EU policy instruments could 
help to further clarify the efficiency and utility of the current policy mix. For instance, the 
cohesion policy and the framework programs have different goals and we were not able to 
distinguish between those programs with the data at hand. 
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Appendix A: Main characteristics of European and national 
policy instruments
9
 
Three main instruments have been developed by the European Commission to contribute to 
competitiveness and the achievement of the goals of the renewed Lisbon Strategy for Growth 
and Jobs, namely the 7th Research Framework Programme (FP7), the Competitiveness and 
Innovation Programme (CIP) and the Cohesion Fund (Structural Funds). These three 
instruments have as a goal to complement each other in order for Europe to become a 
knowledge-based economy, “producing knowledge through research, diffusing it through 
education, and applying it through innovation” (Spring 2005 European Council). The EU's 
FP7 and CIP support national and cross-border research and innovation projects both within 
the EU as well as between the EU and certain non-EU countries and regions. The FP7 
concentrates on research areas where European cooperation is of particular importance. The 
CIP encompasses a broad spectrum of research activities to promote competitiveness and 
innovation, such as the formation of innovation networks, the comparison of innovation 
policies in EU Member States (benchmarking), venture capital financing, and the funding of 
innovation projects. The Cohesion Fund has as a main objective to help depressed regions to 
live up to average European standards.  
The European Cohesion Policy 
Comprising 27 Member States, 271 regions and no less than 493 million citizens, the 
European Union invests in thousands of projects across all over Europe‟s regions to promote 
economic and social cohesion by reducing still existing disparities. The main tool to achieve 
this objective is the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social 
Fund (ESF), otherwise known as the Structural Funds as well as the Cohesion Fund. With a 
total budget of € 347 billion for the period 2007-2013, the Cohesion Policy is the single 
largest source of financial support at EU level, designed to enable all regions to compete 
effectively in the internal market.  
                                                 
9
 The « stylized facts » of this appendix stem from various reports, all of which can be found online. Hence, for 
further details, cf. http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/, 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/atlas2007/germany/index_en.htm, http://ec.europa.eu/social/, 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/index.cfm?pg=reports, 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/pdf/eval2007/country_reports/germany.pdf, 
http://ec.europa.eu/cip/eip/innovation/index_en.htm.  
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European Cohesion Policy in Germany 
Channeled through the Structural Funds, the Cohesion Funds investments have 
supported a large number of investments in Germany. Over the period 2000-2006, over 
1.500 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) received direct investment support 
and about 800 business start-ups received initial funding. Several thousands of research 
jobs were created thanks to Cohesion Fund investment in R&D. Saxony alone received 
some € 230 million for university and research centre support, enhancing the 
competitiveness of the region.  
For the period 2007-2013, Germany has been allocated € 26.4 billion in total, including 
about € 8 billion for R&D and innovation. The largest part of this investment (€ 16.1 
billion) goes into the Convergence Objective. The latter comprises regions of low GDP 
and employment. Hence, the most important part of the funds is directed to depressed 
regions, in order to raise their competitiveness at the national and at the European level. 
Indeed, while Germany performs rather well at the national level (GDP per capita is 
16% higher than EU-average), there are still some discrepancies at the regional level. 
The GDP in Brandenburg for instance is only 76% of the EU-average, while Hamburg‟s 
GDP is 92% above that average. Nowadays, some 15.3 million citizens live in 
“Convergence Regions” in Germany. The Regional Competitiveness and Employment 
Objective (€ 9.4 billion) is applicable to the other regions (the remaining € 0.8 billion go 
under the European Territorial Cooperation Objective). With respect to the policy mix, 
the development of the “Enterprise Environment” is the cornerstone for regional 
development for both Objectives. In terms of R&D and innovation, some € 2.9 billion 
are invested through the Convergence Objectives and some € 1.5 billion through the 
Competitiveness Objective (Schwab, 2010).   
The European Framework Programme 
The 6
th
 Framework programme (FP6, covering the period 2002-2006, having a total budget of 
€ 19.2 billion, respectively 4% of EU Member States‟ combined public R&D support) made a 
total of 213 Calls for Proposals, attracting 56,000 proposals involving 390,000 potential 
participants and awarded some 10,000 contracts to 74,000 participants. Compared to the 5
th
 
Framework Programme (FP5, covering the years 1998-2002), the instruments employed in the 
FP6 led to fewer but bigger projects. On average, the number of participants per contract 
doubled between FP5 and FP6. Compared to FP5, the success rate fell in FP6.  
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FP7, with a total budget of € 50.5 billion, runs between 2007 and 2013. FP7 is composed 
of four different specific programs (+ the Euratomprogramme): (1) Cooperation (64.1% of the 
total budget), (2) Ideas (14.9% of the total budget), (3) People (9.4% of the total budget) and 
(4) Capacities (8.1% of the total budget).
10
 In the three years 2007-2009, 170 calls for 
proposals were concluded, eliciting 55,379 proposals, of which 41,474 passed the formal 
eligibility criteria (or the 1
st
 stage of two-stage calls). Success rates have slightly risen 
between 2007-2009, from just over a fifth to just under a quarter in terms of retained 
proposals.  
The Framework Programme in Germany 
The number of retained proposals for funding in 2009 varies according to the 
programmes. In total, 2,186 applications were received by Germany, out of which 1,198 
were retained for funding. 697 of these retained applications fall under the program 
Cooperation, accounting for a total budget of € 0.6 billion; 58 proposals fall under the 
Ideas programme accounting for € 66 million; 236 proposals fall under People for an 
amount of € 97 million; and 189 under Capacities for an amount of € 84 million. The 
remaining 18 retained proposals fall under the Euratom programme for an amount of € 3 
million. 
The Competitiveness and Innovation Programme (CIP) 
The CIP, with a total budget of approximately € 3.6 billion for 2007-2013, assures specific 
Community support programs and relevant parts of other Community programs in fields that 
are critical to boost European productivity, innovation capacity and sustainable growth. The 
CIP has been developed in order to tackle both, technical as well as non-technical issues. 
Furthermore, the CIP covers market replications of existing technologies that are to be 
utilized in a new and innovative way. If technological solutions have to be validated during 
the market replication phase of an otherwise already demonstrated technology, projects can be 
covered by both, CIP and FP7. Most European innovation support measures under the CIP – 
with the exception of the financial instruments and the business support services provided by 
                                                 
10
 The four objectives “cooperation, ideas, people and capacities” have following more detailed goals: (1) Gain leadership in 
key scientific and technology areas by supporting cooperation between universities, industry, research centers and public 
authorities across the European Union as well as with the rest of the world.; (2) Stimulate the creativity and excellence of 
European research through the funding of "frontier research" in all scientific and technological fields carried out by 
individual teams competing at European level; (3) Develop and strengthen the human potential of European research through 
the support to training, mobility and the development of European research careers (namely through the Marie Curie actions); 
(4) Enhance research and innovation capacity throughout Europe. The FP7 capacities programme aims to develop and fully 
exploit the EU's research capacities through large-scale infrastructures (including e-infrastructures such as GEANT, Grids, 
Supercomputing…), regional (Regions of Knowledge) and cross-border cooperation and innovating SMEs. 
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the Enterprise Europe Network – are more of an indirect nature, not providing direct support 
or assistance to enterprises. 
German National Innovation Policy 
A comprehensive description of the German national R&D and innovation policies is way 
beyond the scope of this paper. The “Pro Inno Europe” website (http://www.proinno-
europe.eu) lists currently 146 different policy schemes that support R&D and innovation in 
Germany. The German federal government did not maintain an R&D tax credit scheme 
during the 1990s and 2000s. The most important policy instrument for supporting innovation 
in the business sector is mission-oriented R&D and innovation funding, that is, direct project 
grants. In 2007, for instance, € 4.5 billion were spent (see BMBF, 2010: 435). 
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Appendix B 
Table B1: Industries in the sample 
Industry Description # of obs. in total sample 
1 Manufacture of food products and beverages 287 
2 Manufacture of textiles 236 
3 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except 
furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 
373 
4 
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products, nuclear fuel, 
chemicals and chemical products 
498 
5 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 438 
6 Manufacture of basic metals 1,030 
7 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c 1,030 
8 
Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment 
and apparatus 
1,259 
9 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 548 
10 
Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel 
487 
11 Land transport; transport via pipelines 771 
12 Financial intermediation and real estate activities 1,777 
  8,734 
 
Table B2: Probit after matching 
Case Number of obs Wald 2(30) p-value 
1 2,796 11.99 0.999 
2 240 13.57 0.995 
3 826 12.4 0.998 
4 176 13.43 0.996 
5 884 18.59 0.948 
7 10,420 27.33 0.606 
10 6690 14.36 0.993 
11 1,816 17.29 0.969 
12 130 10.27 0.999 
 
